

Introduction


CONTEXT: During the next decade, railway stations in England will be impacted by the billions of pounds being invested in current projects such as High Speed 2, Cross Rail and new refurbishment schemes to modernise and develop rail infrastructure.

ISSUE: Railway stations are


- highly networked
- open locations
- often crowded
- vulnerable to terrorism and other forms of crime

There is a need to identify the range of stakeholders and policies that influence the current and future resilience of railway stations to security threats, and to understand the legislative and operational requirements of their design.

Methods



Stakeholder Map



Discussion

- **Currently strategy and communication in the station is ad hoc and fragmented**
 - Increasing operational complexities as more stakeholders become involved
 - Technological advances unlikely to be effective without improved communication structures
- **Policy disconnects surrounding Section 17 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act**
 - Gives the Home Office police forces power to be involved from the design stage
 - BTP do not have any legislation which gives them power to be consulted in the design stage
 - 'Security In Design Of Stations' **guidance** should ensure the BTP are involved from the start of projects. It advises BTP is involved in the early stages of projects **but** is not a statutory requirement & does not guarantee their involvement
- **Corporate security policies do not always dovetail into the security requirements of the station**
 - Many retailers are primarily based in the high street and are not used to the stringent security measures in the station
 - Interpretation of station security strategies can be watered down by retail managers
- **Inevitable trade-offs around security measures, CT & CPTED measures often relegated in importance relative to other design considerations**
 - Security measures still perceived as an afterthought or a grudge purchase
 - If inappropriate measures are fitted during the build, they will have to be retrofitted at a later date, thus having future financial implications.
- **Conflicts occur between stakeholders when financial agendas drive the quality of the security measures used**
 - The BTP make recommendations to stakeholders concerning security measures. CCTV is needed for security but nothing is stated in guidance about the quality of the system. This is capitalised on by stakeholders whose agendas are driven by profit by fitting systems at a minimum cost.